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Difficulties Measuring and Controlling  
Homicide in Rio de Janeiro
Steffen Zdun, Institute of Social Sciences, Braunschweig, Germany
Official crime data is generally limited by restrictions of quality and access. Rio de Janeiro in Brazil provides an example of the problems involved in measuring 
the homicide rate in a developing country, including the lack of proper crime reporting and the use of separate categories to reduce the number of homicides 
in official crime reports. Using longitudinal data, we can explain differences between the official homicide rate and alternative calculations that consider 
otherwise neglected categories. The interests of politicians, police, business, and citizens contribute to the difficulties in measuring and controlling homicides 
in the city.
Like other developing countries, Brazil not only suffers 
high crime rates, but also great difficulties in measuring 
them. The primary crime data is inadequate for various 
reasons. On the one hand, there are problems in registering 
crime properly; on the other, state officials are in the dif-
ficult situation of having to show improvements in public 
security while also demonstrating increasing state re-
pression against perpetrators (which in Brazil usually 
means more lethal). Little information is made publicly 
available, aggregated data is often inaccessible even for 
scientific purposes, and many homicides are omitted from 
the official homicide rate through registration in separate 
categories. Finally, many homicides are never registered at 
all due to structural deficits in the police system and the 
ease with which criminal gangs can permanently hide 
bodies from the authorities. All of this contributes to a 
rather unclear picture of the situation and crime trends in 
the city (Ramos 2006).
These problems exist even though homicide is the offense 
for which most data is accessible in Brazil, and the crime 
that is most widely discussed in public. Data on other 
crimes are even less satisfactory, while the media rarely 
cover incidents of rape, aggravated assault, or robbery un-
less they occur under spectacular circumstances (Cano and 
Iotty 2008). Only kidnappings of middle- and upper-class 
individuals and foreigners are reported as intensively as 
homicides, but they are much rarer – about 400 reported 
cases of kidnapping in Brazil each year, compared to 46,660 
recorded homicides in 2006. Public demands for significant 
reductions in crime focus on homicide, in particular cal-
ling for tough police action against the drug gangs.
Regional policies and intervention programs must also be 
considered in relation to the difficulties controling and 
measuring the homicide rate in Brazil, which differs sig-
nificantly between cities. In recent years there have been ef-
forts to reduce homicide in the big cities throughout Brazil 
and indeed throughout the whole of Latin America. While 
Sao Paulo in Brazil and Bogota and Medellin in Colombia 
have recently been quite successful, Rio de Janeiro has lost 
ground to its traditional rival, the Brazilian industrial and 
business powerhouse of Sao Paulo. The official crime data 
for Rio de Janeiro indicate only a slight reduction in the 
homicide rate from 45.7 (per 100,000 inhabitants) in 2002 
to 40.2 in 2006, whereas it fell from 55.7 to 23.7 in Sao 
Paulo during the same period. Nevertheless, Rio de Janeiro 
can be considered an example illustrating the difficulties of 
measuring and controlling homicide in a developing 
country.
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1. Data and Methods
Brazil has no publicly accessible central reporting of pri-
mary crime data. Data is collected by the Secretary for Se-
curity of each federal state, who is responsible for making it 
available to the public. The information originates from 
the police, which for historical reasons are divided into 
military and civil forces. The military police are responsible 
for patrols and public order, and also operate task forces in 
the favelas. The civil police primarily investigate crime. The 
two forces work independently and individual units collect 
crime data on their own. This in itself causes several prob-
lems, which are discussed further below.
Another problem is inconsistency of reporting. The Secre-
tary for Security decides which data to publish, and how to 
categorize and format it, which makes it difficult to com-
pare specific offenses between states. For instance, Rio de 
Janeiro’s Secretary for Security decided to stop recording 
suspected deaths (morte suspeita) in 2001. Such cases, 
where the police believe that a person is dead but lack suffi-
cient evidence, are frequent in Brazil.1
To fill some of the gaps in the reports of Rio de Janeiro’s 
Secretary for Security, other reports and studies were ana-
lyzed: data from the national Ministry of Justice, the an-
nual UNESCO crime report Mapa da Violencia by Julio 
Waiselfisz (2008), Neither War nor Peace by Luke Dowdney 
(2005), and reports by the Nucleo de Estudos da Cidad-
ania, Conflito e Violencia Urbana in Rio de Janeiro. These 
provide, for example, comparative data from other federal 
states and certain information that is neglected in official 
crime reports, such as the number of firearms-related 
deaths. My analysis is restricted to the period from 1991 to 
2007 because the reliability of the country’s earlier crime 
data is questionable. Brazil had a military dictatorship 
from 1964 to 1985 and it took the government some years 
to establish the current crime reporting system.
2. Results
With its very high homicide rate caused particularly by 
gang warfare and shootouts with the police, Rio de Janeiro 
can be said to be in a state of undeclared war (Caravana 
Comunidade Segua 2007; Dowdeny 2003, 2005). About 90 
percent of the registered homicides in the city have been 
firearms-related since the early 1990s, and no other city in 
Brazil has a higher rate of firearms-related mortality in the 
15–24 age group (Waiselfisz 2008). Although the total 
number of firearms-related deaths has decreased, most 
homicides are still caused by guns. Table 1 shows that Rio 
de Janeiro currently has the highest number of homicides 
by firearms in the country, after a significant reduction in 
Sao Paulo in recent years.
1 Another example for the inconsistency of the 
Brazilian data are the slight differences between po-
lice figures and Ministry of Health data (DATASUS), 
for instance regarding “death by aggression.” The 
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City
Rio de Janeiro
Sao Paulo
Recife
Belo Horizonte
Salvador
Maceio
Curitiba
Fortaleza
Brasilia
Duque de Caxias(*)
Population
2006
6,024,061
10,761,191
1,512,810
2,375,969
2,812,480
864,322
1,771,818
2,389,695
2,393,131
830,408
Number of firearms-related deaths
2002
3,126
3,824
1,181
866
947
396
418
399
569
494
2003
3,002
4,009
1,177
1,170
974
411
520
430
655
512
2004
2,848
2,947
1,167
1,377
876
445
562
427
599
512
2005
2,412
2,345
1,154
1,142
884
514
645
572
536
621
2006
2,235
2,151
1,198
1,038
960
776
724
622
518
460
Rate 2006
37.1
20.0
79.2
43.7
34.1
89.8
40.9
26.0
21.6
55.4
reasons for these discrepancies are not discussed 
here, but should be investigated in further research.
Table 1: Firearms-related deaths 2002–2006
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2.1. General Problems of Measuring Homicides in Rio de Janeiro
For various reasons the number of homicides in Rio de Ja-
neiro is significantly higher than official data suggest. Here 
it is useful first of all to take a look at the longitudinal data 
published by the Secretary for Security, which show the 
homicide rate decreasing by 41 percent from 1991 to 2007, 
although with a spike from 1991 to 1994 to reach the hig-
hest rate in the city’s history. The biggest drop occurred 
from 1994 to 1998, since when the rate has remained 
relatively stable at about 40 per 100,000 inhabitants.
Figure 1: Official homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro 1991–2007
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One problem in measuring the homicide rate is that cer-
tain cases are registered in separate categories, for example 
when it is not immediately certain whether a person was 
actually killed or died in some other way. Where no body is 
found it may not even be certain that someone has died. 
The procedure for separating out provisional cases is not 
incorrect, but it fails to account for the results of sub-
sequent investigations. The problem is that the data are not 
updated in the crime statistics after the case has been clari-
fied. Moreover, no data is published on how many pro-
visional cases are solved and what the results of the 
investigations are. Although these separate categories are 
publicly accessible in the crime reports, they are neglected 
by the media and the public. This causes the homicide rate 
in Rio de Janeiro to be heavily underestimated.
Provisional cases include discovered corpses, bones, missing 
persons, and suspected deaths. Cases where a corpse or 
bones are found are counted in wo separate categories, al-
though autopsies and subsequent investigations usually 
prove that they belong to homicide victims (Cano 1997a). 
In other words, the data stays permanently in two different 
categories but they appear in the official crime reports so 
officials cannot be criticized for hiding them. They just 
label them in a way that reduces the official homicide rate. 
Every year up to 1,000 cases are omitted from homicide 
calculations due to this procedure.
The third provisional category is missing persons. Unlike 
the other separate categories, this one is updated regularly 
to remove those who turn up alive before publication in 
Source: Annual Crime Reports.
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the annual crime reports. However, those who are found to 
have been killed are not added to the homicide category. 
The main reasons why people disappear in big Brazilian 
cities are a) kidnappings for human trafficking, forced 
prostitution, or organ harvesting; b) gang killings where 
the body is not found; and c) police killings where the body 
is disposed of by the police themselves (Machado da Silva 
and Pereira Leite 2007). Runaways who become street 
children are often omitted because they are not report mis-
sing in the first place.2 Altogether, there is little reliable data 
on how many of the people who disappear every year (up 
to 2,000) are actually killed, and no information on this 
matter is supplied in official reports.
Another largely neglected category where many cases 
might be homicides is the morte suspeita. Unlike the cat-
egory of missing persons, a suspected death is recorded 
only where a person is missing and the police have reason 
to assume that they are actually dead, for instance if some-
one involved in illegal business dealings suddenly dis-
appears completely without taking any personal belongings 
(Dowdney 2003). Here it is almost certain at the moment 
of registration that the person has been killed, but there is 
no body. Nonetheless, these cases are registered separately 
and do appear in the homicide statistics even when they 
have been solved. Nor is information available on how 
many cases are solved. None of the state secretaries for se-
curity in Brazil provide any data on this subject. This adds 
another thousand killings per year to the total omitted 
from the official homicide statistics in Rio de Janeiro.
One explanation for the lack of transparency on this cat-
egory is the difficulty of investigating in dangerous favelas 
(Dowdney 2003; Fiocruz 2005). Ordinary police units 
avoid going there because of the risk of getting attacked, 
kidnapped, or killed. Usually only special task forces enter 
these areas to conduct combat actions, so corpses and 
bones are only found incidentally. This makes it rather easy 
for the drug gangs to get rid of members of rival gangs and 
people who do not pay their debts. It is possible that the 
outcome of cases of suspected death is obscured in order to 
conceal the enormous deficits of police investigations.
All cases where individuals are shot by the police are also 
registered separately, as “resisting arrest” (auto de resisten-
cia) rather than homicide. Although this interpretation 
suggests that the person was shot by a police officer acting 
in self-defense, an unknown number of cases actually ap-
pear to be homicides, especially when paramilitary task 
forces invade favelas (Lemgruber 2004; Ramos 2006; 
Soares, Batista, and Pimentel 2007). Shootouts with gangs 
regularly cause casualties, in particular among members of 
the drug factions. Some researchers go so far as to claim 
that many interventions in the favelas are explicitly de-
signed to kill gang members without any intention of ar-
resting them (Ramos 2006). The idea that these killings 
are intentional would be supported by the military de-
meanor of the special units: they enter an area with com-
bat groups (e.g. BOPE, CORE), fight their way through to 
the target, shoot the person, and carry the dead body out 
in a plastic bag visible for all to see (Bottari 2008; Soares, 
Batista, and Pimentel 2007). In a study using data from 
1993 to 1995 when the number of “resisting arrest” cases 
was still fairly low, Ignacio Cano shows that out of 1,340 
cases only 247 targets were arrested uninjured, 360 were 
arrested injured, while 733 were killed during combat op-
erations (Cano 1997b). An analysis of autopsy data for 
these cases shows that 65 percent of the victims were shot 
in the back, suggesting that they were running away or 
were executed.
This category appears also to serve as a means of guaran-
teeing impunity to the police, and to be an ideological issue 
relating to policy governing police operations in Rio de Ja-
neiro. The relatively high level of acceptance of deliberate 
killings by the police among the middle and upper classes 
is discussed below, but we can already note that the city 
would be unlikely to have experienced such a significant 
2 Many street children leave home because of par-
ental neglect or domestic violence, or are thrown 
out by their parents due to lack of money and space. 
In general, reporting a child to be missing causes 
trouble with the authorities and is therefore avoided 
(Rizzini and Lusk 1995). Reporting a relative mis-
sing can, however, also be beneficial in cases where 
their presence could endanger the whole family, for 
instance, if he or she is on the run from a drug gang 
(De Oliveira 2010).
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increase in these incidents without public acceptance. 
Moreover, structural deficits in the training and equipment 
of ordinary police units have to be considered. In contrast 
to the task forces they are rarely provided with adequate 
psychological training, even where their lives are in danger 
on the streets every day (Cano 1997b; Fiocruz 2005). These 
structural shortcomings primarily explain accidental kill-
ings.
Data on “resisting arrest” cases has been available only 
since 1993, when 138 cases were recorded in Rio de Janeiro. 
Since then they have increased steadily to reach 902 in 
2007. National comparison shows that this development is 
specific to Rio. Sao Paulo has double the number of inhab-
itants and many more favelados but annually only about 
three hundred deaths “resisting arrest”. According to Silvia 
Ramos (2006), this difference is due to the efforts of the 
government of Sao Paulo, which actively pursued policies 
to reduce lethal police violence. She criticizes the “license to 
kill” given to police operating in the favelas of Rio de Janei-
ro. Longitudinal crime mapping studies (Cano 1997b; Wai-
selfisz 2008) and the official statistics of the Secretary for 
Security indicate that most killings classified as “resisting 
arrest” occur in disadvantaged neighborhoods or involve 
muggers and robbers shot dead by the police when caught 
in flagrante delicto in privileged neighborhoods. Lem-
gruber (2004) points out that the only difference between 
many police killings and gang shootouts and executions is 
that the former are institutionally and publicly accepted.
The number of policemen killed is relatively small in com-
parison to the number of “resisting arrest” cases. Between 
twenty and forty police officers were killed on duty each year 
since 2000. This number is much lower than the number of 
people shot by the police, and has not increased in recent 
years; in fact, it has decreased since 2004. In 2007 the ratio of 
killed police to citizens killed by the police was 1:28. So while 
the number of “resisting arrest” cases has grown steadily, the 
number of police killed has not increased. This suggests 
firstly that the combat police units operate without many 
casualties on their side. Secondly, the increasing number of 
“resisting arrest” cases cannot be interpreted or “justified” as 
retaliation by the police, even though official statements on 
the prevalence of “resisting arrest” cases usually refer to 
danger and losses on the police side.
Finally, deaths resulting from assault or robbery are re-
ported in two separate categories. About one hundred cases 
that obviously should be considered homicides are ex-
cluded from the official homicide rate every year this way.
Given the omission of the aforementioned categories from 
the official homicide statistics, it is worth calculating alter-
native homicide rates. These are shown in Figure 2.
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When we consider all cases, the alternative homicide rate 
was 98.7 in 1991, peaked at 118.3 in 1994, and decreased to 
91.6 in 2007. the reduction in the homicide rate over the 
past seventeen years was not 41 percent, as the official 
homicide rate suggests, but only 7 percent. This alternative 
homicide rate is likely to be an overestimate because it in-
cludes the category of missing persons, where it is espe-
cially unclear how many victims are actually dead. If we 
recalculate the alternative homicide rate excluding this cat-
egory, the rate is still 76.2 in 1991, reached a peak of 91.6 in 
1994, and decreasing to 62.0 in 2007, producing an overall 
reduction of only 20 percent. Note that the numbers would 
be higher if the category of suspected death was still in-
cluded in the crime reports.
Although the soaring number of “resisting arrest” cases is 
occasionally mentioned by the media, the public is largely 
unaware of the additional categoriesand therefore has the 
incorrect impression that the homicide rate has remained 
rather stable since 1998, nor noticed the peak in 2003. The 
alternative homicide rate was 76.0 in 2003 (excluding mis-
sing persons; including this category it was 110.1). Either 
way, this was the highest rate since 1995.
Rio de Janeiro also has an undefined number of homicides 
that are not registered at all because they are not reported 
to the police, for instance, when drug gangs execute rivals 
(Dowdney 2003). Even relatives and friends might be afraid 
to do so, especially if they know the perpetrators, while fel-
low gang members are more interested in revenge than in 
going to the police. If the body is well hidden, it may never 
be found and friends and relatives get no chance to bury it. 
Sometimes no-one even notices the absence of a victim, or 
it is noticed but no-one feels responsible.
Other homicides are missed by official reports due to 
structural deficits in the police system. Both military and 
civil police are divided into different units with specific re-
sponsibilities and districts (Fiocruz 2005). Lack of cooper-
ation and communication is a major problem for Rio de 
Figure 2: Alternative homicide rates for Rio de Janeiro 1991–2007
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Source: Secretary for Security of Rio de Janeiro, Annual Crime Reports.
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Janeiro’s police. In many respects individual units act as 
rivals. Each unit is particularly concerned about crime rates 
in its own district because these have to be justified to the 
Secretary for Security. This causes paradoxical behavior 
that reduces the quality of the crime data (Lemgruber 
2004). One of the most extreme examples is where officers 
transfer corpses they find in their district or victims they 
have shot themselves to other neighborhoods in order to 
reduce the number of homicides and “resisting arrest” 
cases in their own area. Officers have repeatedly admitted 
this practice in anonymous interviews with researchers and 
journalists and in autobiographies (e.g., Ludemir 2007; 
Soares, Batista, and Pimentel 2007). This enormously re-
duces the quality of crime data because homicides are at-
tributed to areas of the city in which the offense did not 
happen. It also reduces the chances of successful police in-
vestigations and increases the likelihood of homicides 
being registered in one of the separate categories.
Tensions between police units are also responsible for some 
cases not being registered at all. As Ignacio Cano (1997b) 
documented in the 1990s, where two different units get in-
volved in a case it is not unusual for neither of them to 
write an incident report, because each considers this the re-
sponsibility of the other. Simple miscommunication is one 
reason for this problem, but the everyday reality of 
relatively low salaries, inadequate training and equipment, 
and lack of support from higher-ranking officers also con-
tribute to a general lack of motivation (Fiocruz 2005; Lem-
gruber 2004; Ramos 2006).
Finally, another development has to be considered in this 
context. Since the early 1990s, the number of attempted 
homicides has increased in Rio de Janeiro – from 652 cases 
in 1992 to 1,693 cases in 2007. Like in other countries 
(Nieuwbeerta and Leistra 2007), this trend has much to do 
with major improvements in health care infrastructure. 
Many deaths are prevented thanks to better ambulance ser-
vices, better medical equipment, and growing access to 
hospitals. This is a positive trend in the sense that many 
victims are saved, but it also suggests that a large part of the 
decline in the official homicide rate may have been caused 
by improvements in health care for victims rather than 
better crime prevention.
2.2. Public Demands for Repression and Economic  
Interests in Decreasing Crime Rates
Permanent exposure to violence in Rio de Janeiro has 
manifold effects on everyday life and the attitudes and be-
havior patterns of the citizens. Although most inhabitants 
reject violence and live in fear, there is a normalization of 
violence (Grossi Porto 2004; Ramos 2006). Nancy Cardia 
writes: “Peace does not prevail and people do not have the 
opportunity to recover from the conflict” (2002, 163). Al-
though middle- and upper-class people do not live in the 
crime hot-spots where most homicides and other offenses 
occur, they are often more afraid of crime than the favela-
dos.3 Typical reactions are isolating themselves from collec-
tive life, mistrusting other people, moving to gated 
communities, and rejecting social support for the poor. 
This state of permanent fear fuels support for punitive at-
titudes among many privileged people, who come to accept 
and at times even welcome violence against the young male 
favelados with whom they associate the rise in crime (Car-
dia 2002; Dowdney 2003; Machado da Silva and Pereira 
Leite 2007; Paes Machado and Vilar Noronha 2002).
Most privileged citizens demand repression and dis-
criminates the poor rather than acknowledging the societal 
root causes of crime and their own responsibility (for in-
stance, by participating in the exploitation of the marginal-
ized population and as customers for drugs and other 
illegal goods) (Zaluar 2004). Prevention measures that 
might address the societal causes of crime are largely re-
jected as a waste of money. Such developments have been 
comprehensively studied in many countries (Baumer, 
Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Brown 2007; Garland 2000; 
King 2008; Shaftoe 2000; Zdun 2008). However, the level of 
punitiveness seems to be significantly higher in Brazil with 
its high homicide rate and great social inequality than in 
3 No group is more severely affected by firearm-re-
lated mortality than 15- to 24-year-old male favela-
dos (Caravana Comunidade Segua 2007).
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developed countries (Cardia 2002; Cano and Iotty 2008; 
Soares, Batista, and Pimentel 2007; Zaluar and Ribeiro 
1995). Research also suggests a relationship between pro-
ximity and punitiveness. The closer frightened privileged 
citizens live to their discriminated counterparts, the more 
they demand repression and invest in private security (e.g., 
security guards, electric fences, gated communities) 
(Dowdney 2005; Zaluar 2004). This might even explain why 
punitiveness is stronger in Rio de Janeiro (where more than 
seven hundred favelas are spread throughout the city and 
not restricted to remote areas) than in Sao Paulo (where the 
favelas are mainly located in the suburbs and the wealthy 
inner-city neighborhoods are relatively secure). The privi-
leged of Rio de Janeiro hence seem to live in a constant state 
of tension and fear because they have less possibility to es-
cape violence and crime (Cardia 2002; Zdun 2008).
Silvia Ramos (2006) shows that lack of democratization 
contributes to this situation, and also hinders the in-
stitutional development of the police (see also Grossi Porto 
2004). According to Ramos (2006), mainstream society 
does not question the way the police still operate under di-
rectives dating from the military dictatorship. Politicians 
and senior police officers therefore see no need for a transi-
tion from protecting the state to protecting the citizen (see 
also Goncalves Guimaraes, Torres, and de Faria 2005). At 
the national level there is no single document that could be 
called a national public safety policy. NGOs try to improve 
local conditions in individual favelas but their efforts have 
no significant impact on the punitive attitudes of main-
stream society and the behavior patterns of the police.
Overall, the middle and upper classes tend to demand se-
curity by any means (Goncalves Guimaraes, Torres, and de 
Faria 2005; Machado da Silva and Pereira Leite 2007). Even 
abuses up to and including torture are largely tolerated if 
they are intended to force a police suspect to provide in-
formation. Citizens also have an ambivalent attitude to-
ward “resisting arrest” cases. While there is disapproval of 
bystanders getting wounded or killed by the police, a “one 
less to worry about” attitude seems to prevail when it is an-
nounced that the police have killed a gang member. It even 
seems to become common to prefer killings over arrests in 
order to avoid the possibility that a perpetrator may be re-
leased and commit further crimes or break out of prison 
(Goncalves Guimaraes, Torres, and de Faria 2005; Paes Ma-
chado and Vilar Noronha 2002). People even react increas-
ingly indifferently to news that unarmed favelados have 
been shot (Machado da Silva and Pereira Leite 2007). Re-
search suggests that this mainly reflectsa habit of not dif-
ferentiating between delinquent and non-delinquent 
favelados (Cano 1997b; Dowdney 2003). Alba Zaluar 
(2004) argues that this is due to growing individualism 
among citizens and the prioritization of personal needs in 
the post-dictatorship era. Middle-class citizens especially 
seem to be preoccupied with meeting a backlog of needs 
and react with disinterest, anger, and fear to those who dis-
turb this routine. This may even explain why “resisting ar-
rest” cases often go uncriticized.
Like in many other countries, the opinion of the middle 
and upper class counts most in Brazilian society. The fave-
lados that are mainly affected by police killings have no 
lobby and their rejection of police violence is ignored 
(Ramos 2006). The police can therefore openly demon-
strate power (Goncalves Guimaraes, Torres, and de Faria 
2005). This is only occasionally challenged by the media, 
leading to symbolic sanctions against individual police, 
while the media in general rarely report critically on police 
methods (Machado da Silva and Pereira Leite 2007). So it 
fits with the general situation in the city that the biggest 
scandals are when the police accidentally shoot a privileged 
citizen. These cases usually have more severe consequences 
for the police than the unintended killing of a favelado. 
Consequently, firearms seem to be used more carefully by 
police patrolling in the city center and in privileged neigh-
borhoods (Paes Machado and Vilar Noronha 2002).
Despite the rivalry between different police units, internal 
investigations are the exception. This is largely because of 
the code of silence that serves to protect the state and the 
image of the institution (another relict of the military dicta-
torship). Before they have even finished their training police 
recruits internalize that colleagues must be protected by all 
means. The lack of support from superiors fosters a sense of 
community among ordinary officers that includes avoidance 
of investigations and refusal to report misbehavior by col-
leagues (Fiocruz 2005; Soares, Batista, and Pimentel 2007). 
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This mutual support is also based on an interpretation of 
police work in black-and-white terms. The favelados are 
seen collectively as a permanent threat, due to routine life-
threatening experiences with drug gangs and a perceived re-
lationship between non-delinquent favelados and the gangs. 
Unlawful police practices seem to be more common when it 
is ignored that the same law counts in the favelas, even 
though the gangs establish their own laws (Dowdney 2003). 
Thus norm violations by colleagues are justified as an ac-
ceptable reaction and the best way to control violence. This 
leads to a situation where officers distinguish between offi-
cial police work (that conforms to the public image and 
serves to make privileged people feel more secure) and the 
unofficial “real” police work in the favelas that the majority 
cannot understand because “they do not see what the police 
see” (see also Soares, Batista, and Pimentel 2007).4
The public’s demand for security and acceptance of killings 
of favelados appears to be crucial for this development and 
its persistence. People want decreasing crime rates but de-
mand repressive actions that maintain the status quo. Pre-
ventive measures that might address the root causes of 
crime are largely rejected.
The issue of public security affects the economy of Rio de Ja-
neiro too. A recent study by the Instituto de Pesquisa Econ-
omica Aplicada (IPEA) estimates the annual cost of violence 
in Brazil (support for victims and spending on public and 
private security) to be R$ 92 billion, of which R$ 5 billion 
are spent in Rio de Janeiro (Carvalho 2007). The study also 
estimates that losses in the commercial and industrial sector 
caused by violence and insecurity cost the city an additional 
R$ 800 million. Losses in the property sector (residential, 
commercial, and industrial rentals) cost a further R$ 9 bil-
lion. Losses in tourism are estimated at R$ 2 billion. Viol-
ence-related insurance contracts for citizens, businesses, and 
the state cost R$ 1.5 billion. Human losses (death and in-
jury) amount to R$ 700 million. Finally, additional expenses 
for security measures are estimated to cost R$ 2 billion. 
These add up to a total of R$ 21 billion (about 21 billion) in 
direct and indirect costs in Rio de Janeiro every year.
Various political initiatives seek to reduce crime or at least 
improve the city’s image among residents, international in-
vestors, and tourists. In terms of public approval and econ-
omic goals it is important to be competitive in comparison 
to other cities in the country. Rio de Janeiro has to respond 
to the reduction in the homicide rate that Sao Paulo has 
achieved while its own stagnated at a high level since 1998. 
The separate categories may be useful for concealing the 
real number of homicides and reducing the reported rate, 
but even this can only create the impression of a slightly 
decreasing homicide rate. The challenge will be to conduct 
changes at the institutional and social level in order to 
better measure and control crime, in particular homicide.
3. Discussion
Statistical and structural shortcomings contribute to a situ-
ation where the quality of homicide data in Rio de Janeiro 
is relatively poor and there are real difficulties in control-
ling lethal violence. Some problems are of a methodologi-
cal nature; others relate to structural deficits in the police 
system. Even killings of gang members during police raids 
are ordered from above and tolerated, due to tense class re-
lations, by a mainstream majority in society that fears 
being robbed, wounded, or killed in the streets. As long as 
they mainly affect favelados, arbitrary and brutal behavior 
patterns are not questioned. Politicians and police leaders 
even seem to feel that economic interests encourage them 
to maintain authoritarian policies and policing methods. 
Repression is still the main strategy for addressing violence 
and crime in Rio de Janeiro.
The complex dynamics of organized crime, punitive public 
attitudes, and the political and policing difficulties of con-
trolling violence are exacerbated by the huge number of un-
reported homicides (and other crimes). On the one hand, 
up to four thousand killings per year are registered in separ-
ate categories (i.e. other than homicide). The problem is 
that even though they are defined as provisional cases, the 
homicide data are not updated to reflect the results of police 
investigations. Moreover, several hundred cases of “resisting 
arrest” every year are not considered homicides, even if they 
4 Police research in developed countries shows 
similar patterns that protect colleagues from institu-
tional sanctions, which are interpreted as attacks on 
their everyday work (Schweer and Zdun 2005).
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partly appear to be intended killings of gang members by 
the police. There is also an unknown number of homicides 
that are not registered at all by the police, largely as a result 
of the low level of institutional organization in the favelas. 
The crime hot-spots in Rio de Janeiro are mainly controlled 
by the drug factions, so bodies can easily be hidden. False 
recording and non-registration of homicides due to struc-
tural and motivational deficits and rivalry between police 
units further reduces the quality of the crime data.
Despite the local peculiarities of Rio de Janeiro and its high 
homicide rate, several general patterns and problems of 
crime – and its registration and reporting – appear to be 
shared by many big cities in developing countries and re-
duce the respective quality of life (UNODC 2007). Even if 
the complexity of the overall situation makes it difficult to 
elucidate the specific problems and shortcomings, other 
South American cities such as Sao Paulo have been quite 
successful in reducing their homicide rates in recent years. 
In other words, the situation and measurement of homi-
cides can be improved. What this seems to require is an in-
tegrated sustainable approach involving all the different 
parties. Comparative studies are required in order to ob-
tain a broader picture of the similarities and differences in 
approaches and outcomes.
Rio de Janeiro appears to need a police reform to improve 
working conditions, salaries, training, and equipment, and 
correct inappropriate methods. This should improve moti-
vation, reduce misbehavior (including corruption), and cut 
the number of “resisting arrest” cases. However, these 
changes would also require broad action to improve the so-
cial climate: integrated approaches addressing the punitive 
attitudes of mainstream society and tackling the root 
causes of crime among the favelados. This would include 
strengthening the social engagement of the middle and 
upper class and investing in the education, prospects, and 
living conditions of the marginalized population. Such de-
velopments can be moderated and supported by state in-
stitutions, but what they require most is motivation and 
mutual trust among citizens. Indeed, lack of social control 
and awareness of the problems and needs of fellow citizens 
seems to exacerbate the difficulties in controlling homi-
cides and other crimes in Rio de Janeiro.
Finally, the measurement and control of homicide belong 
together. In this pursuit non-repressive crime reduction is 
one of the most ambitious but also promising goals in ef-
forts to fight crime in Rio de Janeiro and comparable cities. 
But control and measurement also require structural devel-
opments and improvements in relations between all in-
volved parties. With respect to the measurement of 
homicides, more transparency and a more appropriate use 
of the separate categories in the crime reports are recom-
mended, even if this would temporarily lead to higher total 
numbers of recorded homicide.
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